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 19 
Abstract  20 
 This paper explores empirical evidence as well as a theoretical model of   fisheries in the 21 
Black Sea which have become depleted as a result of both environmental degradation and 22 
overexploitation. We examine overfishing and the optimal fish catch, and derive Evolutionary 23 
Stable Strategies (ESS) from a game theory perspective by using agent risk profiles.  We explain 24 
how risk-averse fishers may choose to fish at unsustainable levels, even though it may reduce 25 
their overall fish catch in the long run. Risk attitudes of artisanal fishers within the frameworks 26 
of expected utility and prospect theories also have implications on risk aversion and non-27 
cooperation.  We explore  how social norms between fishers could  encourage cooperation in 28 
fishing at sustainable levels, but finds that these norms and information networks have not 29 
developed enough in the Black Sea to be effective.   30 
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1.1.  Introduction 39 
 40 
Tragedy of the commons as well as Elinor Ostrom’s work on non-tragedy of the 41 
commons have been applied to environmental issues extensively.  Given the evidence for the 42 
depletion of some natural resources, such as fish in the Black Sea, various riparian and non-43 
riparian governments and international organizations have acted to stop and reverse the depletion 44 
trends by various meetings and agreements (Ostrom, 2000; Dietz et al., 2002; Schlager and 45 
Ostrom, 1992; BSC, 2009; GFCM, 2012).   As we study risk profiles and different fishing 46 
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strategies in this paper, we examine the situations under which individual fishers can be 47 
persuaded to adopt evolutionary stable fishing strategies.  The size of the fishing firm we 48 
consider here is small and artisanal, which is representative of many fishing communities in the 49 
Black Sea (Berkes, 1986).  The first sections of the paper are a literature survey on Black Sea 50 
fisheries, the time trends in  landed fish, and   game theoretic evolutionary stable fishing 51 
strategies.  Risk profiles of artisanal fishers, prospect theory and conclusions are presented in the 52 
final  sections.   53 
1.2  Literature Survey on Black Sea Fisheries 54 
The Black Sea is classified as an inland sea and has an area  of  436,400 km2 (168,500 sq 55 
mi), excluding the Azov Sea (Bakan and Buyukgungor, 2000).  It is surrounded by six riparian 56 
countries and  has a drainage basin over five times its own area, mainly from the deltas of the 57 
Danube and Dnieper Rivers (Mee, 1992).  (Figure 1).  58 
 Insert Figure 1 here 59 
The industrial activities of the region had taken a severe toll on the ecosystem. One of the 60 
most severe crises facing the Black Sea caused directly by human activity is the eutrophication 61 
of the waters- that is, the reaction of an aquatic ecosystem to an unexpected influx of fertilizers 62 
and/or sewage (Mee, 1992).  Up to 95% of the shallow NW Black Sea and Azov Sea are  prone 63 
to hypoxia, which resulted in the elimination of entire species of deep-water fish, which can no 64 
longer survive at low levels of oxygen.   Mee (1992) used this ecological process to explain the 65 
sudden collapse of the fishing industry since the 1960s and 1970s. Only six   of the 26 species of 66 
fish that were commercially caught and sold in the mid-20th century remain abundant enough to 67 
be viable economically to harvest (Mee, 1992). Overexploitation has also depleted fish stocks  68 
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(Leppakoski and Mihnea, 1996; Turan et al., 2005). This is partly caused by variations in 69 
regulations over the years.  Policies to boost the fishing economy in the 1980s reduced size 70 
restrictions on certain fish caught, allowing much more to be harvested, resulting in a rate of 71 
fishing that could not be naturally sustained.   The collapse of the landed catch in 1990 was also 72 
due to the growth of jelly fish (comb jelly or Mnemiopsis leidyi), which scavenged the eggs, and 73 
the larvae of the important fish in the Black Sea region (Turan et al, 2005).     Leppakoski and 74 
Mihnea (1996)   report that the Romanian Coast fish harvests  of sturgeon  (acipenser), Black Sea 75 
turbot  (psetta), anchovy (engraulis), and gobies all were  much lower level in 1990 than  in 76 
1971.  Daskalov (2002) attributes the rise of total catch in the 1970s  to a general shift away 77 
exploitation of  large predatory fish to smaller pelagic fish.   78 
 A plot of  both total and anchovy fish catch for the Black Sea from   1970-2010 is 79 
given in Figure 1. Total catch began to increase in the mid-1970s, with the average catch more 80 
than doubling between 1975 and 1985. However, the biomass began to be depleted due to comb 81 
jelly invasion and overexploitation,  so that by 1990, the  total catch had fallen to levels below 82 
that of   1970 .  The maximum sustainable catch (MSY)  threshold must have been crossed at 83 
some point during the late 1970s and early 1980s because the yearly catches sharply dropped 84 
soon afteri.   Due to these trends, it is more desirable  to remain at sustainable fishing levels in 85 
the short run even when more fishing is possible,  to retain the biomass to sustain future fishing 86 
(Die and Caddy, 1997;  Garcia et al., 1989).  87 
            Insert Figure 2  here 88 
This 1990 fisheries crisis prompted the 1992 Bucharest Convention by the Black Sea 89 
Commission  for  protection against pollution  with a permanent secretariat which is still in 90 
existence today.ii Table  1  reports  the relative percent of fishing stock composition for the six 91 
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major Black Sea riparian countries in 2008 based on the General Fisheries Commission for the 92 
Mediterranean (GFCM)  (2012)  database.   93 
Insert Table 1 here 94 
Anchovy is the largest catch for all countries at over 70%, with sprat coming in second at almost 95 
20%.  Together, these two species account for over 91% of all landings in fisheries across the 96 
Black Sea, providing indicators for analyzing economic impacts of the changing biodiversity of 97 
the region.  During the 1960s and 1970s anchovies only made up around 54% of the total catch, 98 
and the rest were several other species such as the mackerel, whiting, and bonito. Overfishing 99 
and the ecological crisis of the late 1980s caused a substantial shift in the species makeup of the 100 
region, and many smaller species either died out or ceased to be included in the fishing stocks 101 
(GFCM, 2012;  Eremeev and Zuyev, 2007; Oguz, 2005). Commercial species soon collapsed 102 
under the combination of overexploitation and new invasive predators, so that harvest yields 103 
sharply dropped across the basin by 1990.  By the late 1980s, the fishing industry in the region 104 
directly supported almost two million inhabitants (Travis, 1993). Direct harvest losses incurred 105 
from the crash of the early 1990s cost the basin $240 million USD.      106 
The reaction of local communities to these changes has been examined by analyzing the 107 
small scale fishing industry of the Eastern Black Sea from a new institutional economics 108 
perspective- that is, how small groups and communities both manage and govern their shared 109 
resources (Knudsen, 2008).  Knudsen studied the  traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and 110 
the local customs of the community of Carsibasi on the Eastern coast of the Black Sea as a case 111 
to determine how these small fishing towns  conduct business in the absence of formal 112 
regulations and in the face of the changing ecological makeup of the sea.   Even though Turkey’s 113 
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Ministry of Agriculture updates the national fishing regulations every two years, regulations on 114 
small boats are virtually non-existent due to the near-impossible task of enforcement and the 115 
implicit recognition that such regulations would cripple small subsistence fishers.  Locals instead 116 
rely on a network of informal regulations and unwritten rules to bring order to the short but 117 
frantic fishing season in late spring/early summer.  Knudsen (2008) found  that it is the “ethical 118 
know-how” of fishing based on mutual respect and unspoken rules of courtesy amongst the 119 
fisherman of the community that allows the small-boat industry to thrive from generation to 120 
generation while also adapting to the changing ecological landscape of the Black Sea coast.  121 
Knudsen’s analysis shows how artisanal and local fishers have had to adapt to the changing 122 
biological makeup of the Black Sea, and how their economic livelihood is directly related to the 123 
amount of fish available to them. 124 
1.3   Maximum Sustainable Yield 125 
 While individual agents act and adapt to the conditions, the means of fishing, such as 126 
blast fishing, bottom  trawling and bycatch,  lead to overfishing that adversely affect the future 127 
biomass  (see Reeves Reeves and  Notarbartolo di Sciara, 2006; Gerlak, 2004).  The concept of   128 
MSY is an estimate of an optimum fish catch each year that both maximizes current fish yield 129 
but also leaves enough of the biomass still unexploited in the sea to continue the yield in future.     130 
A function that can accurately model the maximum sustainable that yield obtainable by all 131 
fishing parties is given by Knowler et al.  ( 2001). 132 
Qt+1 = σ * St       [1] 133 
 134 
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Here,  Qt+1  is the total exploitable fish population available in the next year,  σ is the natural 135 
survival rate of fish in the environment and St is the population that survives the year’s harvest. 136 
St can be expressed  as  137 
  St  =   Qt  – h( Qt, Et)      [2] 138 
where Qt  is the total population of fish at time t  and h is a function of fish catch, which is  a 139 
function of both Q,  and E, the fishing effort exerted over the year. 140 
Various methods of estimating a value for the amount of  fish which can be harvested 141 
each year  to maintain  MSY have been proposed (Die and Caddy, 1997; Garcia et al., 1989). 142 
This estimator is an important component of an effective fisheries management structure for 143 
several reasons. First of all, many countries with fishing economies are considered “developing” 144 
and may not be able to afford regular, formal assessments of fish stock that occur in more 145 
developed countries (Die and Caddy, 1997).  Most riparian countries around the Black Sea are in 146 
this classification and an estimator equation provides them with a theoretical limit on fishing to 147 
sustain the population without the costly physical assessment. Secondly, a theoretical estimate 148 
enables comparisons with current fishing levels to be able to make accurate predictions and 149 
policy recommendations for the ecological preservation of the species.   Die and Caddy (1997) 150 
and Garcia et al,  (1989)  underline  the limits of applying  MSY estimators. The MSY should 151 
not be used as a benchmark or a goal for fish harvests both because of its unpredictability and the 152 
dangers of overexploitation even by a very small amount.  Food and Agricultural Organization 153 
(FAO) of the UN and its Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries  specifically differentiates 154 
between reference points not to be approached, such as the MSY value, and “benchmarks for 155 
safe exploitation”  ( FAO, 1995; Die and Caddy, 1997).                      .  156 
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The MSY estimator is an important piece in a game theory model for maximum  payoffs   157 
which must be taken into account to study  allocation between  parties. Black Sea fishing is 158 
plagued with many problems, yet cooperation will increase the total available fish population by 159 
a series of mutual reductions in both pollution and overexploitation.  The section below models 160 
one of these problems, that of overfishing, where the behavior of fishing parties are examined to 161 
see under which conditions  cooperation will occur.  The basic concepts of the model can then be 162 
extended to multiparty cooperation on overexploitation. 163 
2.1    Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) in a Fishing Game 164 
A game theory perspective can help explain environmental issues by indicating what 165 
actions people would choose to take regarding the harvesting of natural resources, and how these 166 
actions would impact the environment. Here we  model the behavior of two artisanal  fishers, the  167 
dominant firm size of  the Black Sea region.  This model can also be extended to the two-nation 168 
bilateral game on cooperation, or in equation form, to multilateral co-operations. 169 
 In a  model of a fishing game, one can determine how intensively fishers would choose 170 
to harvest fish based on how many fish they expect to catch and how many fish they expect the 171 
other fisher to catch.  Based on this knowledge, one can find a best strategy, or Nash equilibrium 172 
(NE), or in many of these instances,  multiple best strategies for players to play.  In the multiple 173 
best-strategy  situations,  over multiple rounds, the game may eventually converge to each fisher 174 
playing one particular strategy, called an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS.  To determine 175 
which NE are ESS, they must meet one of two conditions presented below.  Let A be the payoff 176 
of a strategy, let there be two strategies i and j, and let * denote Nash strategy.  Then 177 
 178 
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 Condition 1: Ai*i* > Aij*  ∀  j≠i     [3] 179 
  180 
Condition 1 indicates that the payoff of both players using the NE strategy is greater than the 181 
payoff of one player using a NE strategy and the other player using any other strategy. 182 
  183 
Condition 2: Ai*j > Ajj       ∀  j i     [4] 184 
  185 
Condition 2 indicates that the payoff of one player using the NE strategy and another player 186 
using any other strategy is greater than the payoff of both players using strategies that are not the 187 
NE strategy (Barron, 2008).   188 
Once  cooperation quotas are set for limiting fish catch, one can look at various scenarios 189 
to see when fishers  will cooperate with  guidelines.  Below is an example of a rather utopic  190 
game in which two players can either cooperate (restrict) with quotas or not (Matrix A).  191 
Suppose the total fish catch has a value of 4.  Monitoring is costly and suppose, if incurred, 192 
monitoring costs 6.  The payoffs can be structured such that the fishers are promised a payoff of 193 
5 each (2 as catch plus a one-timeiii subsidy of 3 each), the latter of which equal monitoring costs 194 
(if incurred)  if they choose to cooperate within the sustainability guidelines. The present day 195 
payoff  to the players in the game is  now greater if they cooperate.      196 
                                                                       197 
 198 
Matrix A 199 
   Fisher 2 200 
         Cooperate  Don’t Cooperate 201 
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Fisher 1 Cooperate  5,5   0,4 202 
           203 
  Don’t Cooperate 4,0   2,2 204 
 205 
 If both players choose to cooperate, then the fish population will remain at a sustainable level, 206 
allowing both fishers to gain a value of 5 from the sea, in catch and in subsidies.  If one 207 
fisherman chooses to cooperate and the other does not, then the party that who does cooperate is 208 
able to take advantage of the game to gain a value of 4, while the other party loses out and gains 209 
nothing.  While the fisher that chooses not to cooperate gains more than the other fisher, the 210 
fisher only gains 4, which is still less than he could have received had both of the fishermen 211 
cooperated.  If neither player cooperates, then both of the fishermen only receive a catch value of 212 
2 from fishing.   213 
 Calculating the NE from the game will result in two pure strategies and one mixed 214 
strategy.   The first pure strategy is for both players to cooperate, the second is for both players  215 
not to cooperate.  The third is a mixed strategy where both players cooperate 2/3 of the time and 216 
not cooperate 1/3 of the time.  Played among rational players, these strategies may occur in one 217 
round, but played in multiple rounds and with multiple players, the strategies may move toward a 218 
particular equilibrium, depending on the characteristics of the players.  The equilibrium that the 219 
players will move toward can be determined by testing for the evolutionary stable strategy.  This 220 
strategy would be adopted by the entire players of fishers, and would not be moved away from, 221 
even if occasionally fishers deviate from the strategy. We can show the three NE of this game: 222 
X1, Y1    is where the players both cooperate,  X2, Y2  where they both do not cooperate and X3, Y3  223 
is the mixed  strategy. The values in equations 5 to 7 are probabilities. 224 
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 225 
Nash Equilibria:  X1 = (1, 0)  Y1 = (1,0)     [5] 226 
   X2= (0, 1)  Y2 = (0,1)     [6] 227 
   X3= (2/3, 1/3)  Y3 = (2/3,1/3)                  [7] 228 
 229 
Testing these three NE for ESS, we find that condition 1 is met for only the pure NE strategies  230 
(of players both cooperating and both not cooperating)iv but not for the mixed strategy.   In other 231 
words, in an environment with many fishers playing similar games, both fishers will tend to 232 
follow the pure strategies of either cooperation or non-cooperation with guidelines.  Which NE 233 
they will move towards depends on the initial conditions with respect to the mixed NE. For this 234 
example, if initially more than 2/3 of fishers choose to cooperate in fishing, then the population 235 
will move away from the mixed NE towards the pure NE where all of them will cooperate. This 236 
could also be called moral or societal pressure for the higher aim.  If initially less than 2/3 of the 237 
fishers choose not to cooperate in fishing, then the population will move in the opposite direction 238 
towards the pure NE of all of them non-cooperating ((Figure 3). 239 
 240 
Insert Figure 3 here 241 
  242 
The analysis of the ESS indicates that it would take a significant portion of the fishers to 243 
cooperate in fishing before permanent cooperation could be achieved.  However, if enough 244 
fishers cooperate, then the ESS indicates that a healthy level of fishing that protects the biomass 245 
could be achieved by limiting total catch to the MSY estimate.   246 
 247 
2.2  An Alternative ESS Game: What if there are no incentives for cooperation?  248 
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 Suppose  that there are no incentives for cooperation. Such a game is given in Matrix  249 
B below: 250 
 251 
Matrix B 252 
   Fisher 2 253 
         Cooperate  Don’t Cooperate 254 
Fisher 1 Cooperate  5,5   0,5 255 
            256 
  Don’t Cooperate 5,0   2.5,2.5 257 
 258 
 259 
In this situation, cooperation or non-cooperation by a single party have the same payoffs (5) 260 
unless both parties do not cooperate. Then the payoff for each is 2.5. In this game, there are two 261 
pure NE where the players will either both choose to cooperate  or both choose to not cooperate.  262 
However, only one ESS strategy may be eventually adopted by all fishers over multiple games 263 
among multiple fishers. 264 
 265 
 266 
Nash Equilibria:  X1 = (1, 0)  Y1 = (1,0) 267 
   X2= (0, 1)  Y2 = (0,1) 268 
 269 
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Testing  for ESS, we find the payoff of the two strategies that are not the NE are higher than the 270 
payoff of one player using the NE strategy and the other player using any other strategy. This 271 
illustrates that both players playing cooperation  is not an ESS  but   both players playing ‘don’t 272 
cooperate’ is an ESS strategy.  The fishers over time will move toward this ESS strategy of non-273 
cooperation.    Therefore, if the payoff to the party who does not cooperate is the same as the 274 
payoff  if they cooperate, non-cooperation by all parties is the ESS solution.  This is not a 275 
socially desirable outcome for the preservation of the environment and of the fish biomass.  276 
 277 
2.3  Overcoming the Problem of  Non-Cooperation 278 
 Finding that non-cooperation is the only ESS NE solution for the example in Matrix B 279 
may help explain why we observe tragedy of the commons with respect to fisheries in most 280 
emerging economies, as well as in the Black Sea.  The results of the previous section, the ESS 281 
and prisoner’s dilemma models, may indicate that it is difficult or even impossible for players to 282 
cooperate without any outside intervention, but other factors may exist that can support 283 
cooperation.   284 
Empirical tests of prisoner’s dilemma games have often found that players take actions 285 
that do not fit the standard expectations for the game.  For example, in a public goods game in 286 
which players are given an endowment and make the choice to contribute money for a collective 287 
good, the standard game theory model indicates that no players will contribute to the collective 288 
good, as there is no individual incentive for them to do so (Ostrom, 2000).  This is similar to the 289 
prisoner’s dilemma and ESS models for fisheries where the best strategy for each player is to not 290 
cooperate with one another to gain a higher payoff.  When the game is tested among  291 
participants, players tend to contribute between 40 to 70 percent of their endowments in the first 292 
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round, and while contributions fall in repeated rounds, they remain above zero.  Finally, if 293 
players are given the option to punish other players, some will punish players who do not 294 
cooperate, even though they should have no incentive to do so.  The results from these games 295 
indicate that players tend to cooperate to a greater extent than standard models would predict 296 
(Ostrom, 2000).  If these experimental observations are extended to the case of fishers in the 297 
Black Sea, then it is possible that individuals will be more likely to  cooperate with one another 298 
successfully, such as in the Carsibasi  case in Turkey.    299 
 To determine whether players can cooperate, it is important to explain why they are not 300 
following the NE strategy, even though it would appear to be in their self-interest to do so.  301 
Ostrom (2000) explains these results by differentiating between three types of players.  “Rational 302 
egoists” fit the traditional economic model of players who rationally seek to maximize their own 303 
gains.  “Conditional cooperators” are players who are willing to cooperate to achieve higher 304 
gains so long as they expect other players to cooperate as well.  Estimates find these people make 305 
up a significant proportion of the population, ranging from 40 to 60 percent of people.  They 306 
attach an extra value to trust and cooperation, which can make their internal payoffs different 307 
than just the monetary values that are expressed in the game.  “Willing punishers” are players 308 
who choose to punish players who do not cooperate for the common good, even though it may be 309 
costly to them.  The presence of willing punishers and conditional cooperators who are more 310 
willing to cooperate and enforce cooperation can prevent situations similar to the prisoners’ 311 
dilemma from occurring (Ostrom, 2000).  The presence of these types of players in the 312 
population of fishers would increase the potential for cooperation.   313 
 A variety of contextual factors are important to whether individuals will be able to form 314 
social norms to cooperate and govern a common resource effectively.  One important factor is 315 
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whether the use of the resource can be monitored (Dietz et al., 2002). While  observing the total 316 
amount of fish in the sea is not a feasible possibility,  local fishermen may be able to monitor the 317 
people who are fishing in the sea (Acheson, 1975).  Another important factor is whether the 318 
economic  system is in a state of rapid transition,  since a stable system of social norms may  be 319 
unable to develop (Dietz et al., 2002).  Face-to-face communication is also an important 320 
determinant of whether cooperation will occur.  In experimental tests of the prisoner’s dilemma,  321 
face-to-face communication was a major determinant of the level of cooperation that occurred 322 
(Ostrom, 2000).  The Black Sea is a fairly large body of water with many different languages 323 
spoken on its shores, so face-to-face communication between everyone would be impossible, but 324 
smaller local groups of fishermen along a national shore would possibly be able to develop these 325 
relationships.  326 
 For social norms to successfully develop, the group must be able to exclude outsiders to 327 
control entry into the group  to  prevent a large influx which  would potentially destabilize the 328 
system.  Once again, on the level of the entire sea this would be difficult, but in local groups of 329 
fishers it would be possible.  This type of cooperation and social norms are similar to the TEK  330 
and social structure observed in the Carsibasi region. 331 
Finally, fishers would have to take the responsibility to monitor and enforce the rules 332 
governing fair usage of the waters (Dietz et al., 2002).  At the local level this would be possible, 333 
but not guaranteed.  Overall, there are some conditions in the Black Sea that would encourage 334 
workers to cooperate to take care of the fisheries, but other factors that may discourage 335 
cooperation.  Based on the empirical evidence showing that fish populations have decreased over 336 
time, these social norms appear to not have developed enough to prevent overexploitation.  337 
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Government actions can be taken to encourage the responsible use of the sea, yet  policies 338 
that focus on rules and regulation tend to harm social norms that direct the use of the common 339 
sea.  Government regulations towards the commons tend to be ineffective because they are 340 
slower to react to changes in the social, political, and economic setting in which they are 341 
implemented, which often makes them ineffective.  Policies towards the common resource of the 342 
sea also tend to be difficult to enforce, so fishers can often circumvent restrictions (Dietz et al., 343 
2002).  Experimental evidence also indicates that government programs and rules to encourage 344 
responsible fishing could actually harm social norms that encourage farmers to cooperate.  In 345 
tests of prisoners’ dilemma games, imposing external incentives to cooperate on players made 346 
them much less likely to cooperate after these incentives were removed (Ostrom, 2000).  347 
Evidence indicates that directly regulating fisheries would potentially crowd out social norms 348 
and would not be an effective solution to overexploitation.   349 
The better government policy would be to support social norms on a local level that 350 
encourage fishers to cooperate and conserve resources. Governments can encourage these norms 351 
by respecting the rights of groups of fishers to organize and by giving them a medium to settle 352 
their disputes.  This will legitimize and strengthen the system of norms without harming the 353 
system (Ostrom, 2000).  Governments in the Black Sea can use these strategies to support 354 
cooperation among fishers in the Black Sea without relying on extensive rules and regulations.   355 
 The games discussed so far show the importance of payoffs and social norms to reach 356 
desirable social outcomes for preserving MSY.  Risk preferences of fishers also modify games 357 
when a player’s perception of risk often create results that do not match model predictions.  In 358 
the next section, we discuss risk preferences and how they may further affect artisanal fishing in 359 
the Black Sea. 360 
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 361 
3.1  The Influence of Risk Preference on the Fishing Game: Expected Utility Theory and 362 
Prospect Theory 363 
Factors of risk and loss aversion of artisanal  fishers will also play an important role in 364 
determining which NE  players will choose to play.   In  choosing a strategy, each player faces 365 
uncertainty about the strategy the other player will select.  When players take this risk into 366 
consideration, they often face choices between a risky strategy (with both a higher potential 367 
payoff- higher possibility of a loss), and a safe strategy (with a lower payoff-lower possibility of 368 
a loss).   For example,  in  the previous ESS game between two fishers (Matrix A), two pure NE 369 
would be played which were ESS but between the two, cooperation would maximize the gains 370 
for both players.   That strategy for both is then  payoff dominant, indicating that players should 371 
play this strategy to receive the highest payoff of 5.    Yet players who are risk-averse would 372 
dislike the possibility that they could gain nothing, and could avoid the risk by choosing to not 373 
cooperate, allowing them to get payoffs of either 4 or 2.    In this case,  risk-averse players  with 374 
a short time horizon and a large discount rate for the future will choose to not cooperate, which is 375 
considered the risk dominant strategy.    This is a further refinement of  the findings of ESS 376 
strategies and the outcome of non-cooperation is not socially desirable. 377 
  Some scholars have argued that rational players should always choose the payoff 378 
dominant strategy because they expect to maximize their gains and they expect the other player 379 
to do so as well.  This argument relies on the idea that players will be able to make decisions 380 
based on a “collective rationality” where “rational individuals will cooperate in pursuing their 381 
common interests if the conditions permit them to do so” (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, p. 359).  382 
However, other scholars reject this viewpoint and argue that risk-averse players will choose to 383 
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play the risk dominant strategy to avoid the possibility of a loss.  They argue that it is not 384 
possible for players to form together as one group that makes collectively rational decisions.  385 
Because players will not successfully cooperate and make decisions together, they make 386 
individually rational decisions in which they do not cooperate with one another, and are likely to 387 
choose the risk dominant equilibrium (Straub, 1996)v.  388 
 Experimental evidence indicates that participants tend to choose the risk dominant 389 
equilibrium in many gamesvi. These studies emphasize the importance of the risk dominant 390 
strategy and indicate that the more risk-averse fishers are, the less likely they will be to cooperate 391 
in some situations.  Observation of each individual fisherman’s preferences is not a realistic 392 
option, but because individuals’ social and economic environments have been shown to affect 393 
risk preferences, they can give some indication as to how risk-averse the players would be.   394 
 Past macroeconomic experiences, such as an economic  recession, have been found to 395 
increase risk aversion even after the event passes, although the effect eventually fades.  For 396 
younger individuals who have less lifetime experience, this effect is also greater (Malmendier 397 
and Nagel,  2011).   Many of the fishers in Black Sea  have been exposed to negative economic 398 
conditions in the Soviet Union following its dissolution in the 1990 s, when growth in the region 399 
was highly unstable.   Based on these economic experiences we can expect most of the fishermen 400 
to be more risk-averse and less likely to cooperate with one another.   401 
 Differences in risk taking by gender may also play a role in how risk-averse 402 
individuals may be.  Many studies have found that women tend to be more risk-averse than men 403 
regarding   financial risk taking  in the United States  (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998),  and in 404 
making consumer decisions  and  lifestyle choices (Hersch,  1996).  While generalizing the data 405 
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to other situations and individuals outside the United States is very  problematic, these studies 406 
may indicate that the fishers in the Black Sea, who are generally men, would be more  risk-407 
averse  if their group included a larger  proportion of females to males.   We do note, though, that 408 
gender differences in risk aversion for small agents in environmental studies need to be studied 409 
further  before any generalizations can be made at present.    410 
 These observations on how fishermen would view uncertainty generally rely on a 411 
traditional economic view of risk known as Expected Utility Theory (EUT).  EUT generally 412 
adopts the view that players are endowed with a certain preferences towards risk that make them 413 
either risk-seeking, risk-neutral, or risk-averse.  The preferences of a player are based on the 414 
utility, value or satisfaction he gains from different amounts of income which can be expressed 415 
as: 416 
 U(s,d) = (s+d)r      [8] 417 
 418 
where s represents the initial endowment of money held by the individual, d represents the 419 
amount of income gained by the individual, and r is some parameter that represents the rate at 420 
which an individual’s utility increase, and U(s,d) indicates the level of utility the individual 421 
receives from the endowment and gain in income.  EUT also finds that individuals will measure 422 
the expected value of uncertain outcomes by combining the probability of each outcome with the 423 
utility they would receive from it.  This can be modeled with the equation: 424 
 425 
                 [9]   426 
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 427 
where n is the number of possible outcomes, pk is the probability of outcome k, and Uk is the 428 
utility of outcome k.  This model assumes that people will be consistently either risk-seeking 429 
(r>1) or averse (r<1) depending on the parameter r (Harrison and Rutström, 2008).     430 
 While EUT may make sense in many situations, evidence from psychology indicates 431 
that people often act in ways that do not match the model.  One major problem with the theory is 432 
that people’s risk preferences are not consistent, and can vary between being risk-averse and 433 
risk-seeking depending on the situation (Rabin and Thaler, 2001).  The failure of expected utility 434 
to accurately model human behavior has led researchers to modify expected utility theory and 435 
develop another  model for describing human behavior under risk, known as Prospect Theory 436 
(PT).  Prospect Theory argues that when people are presented with a risky choice, they do not 437 
take into account their initial endowment, but are mainly concerned with how they frame the 438 
choice as a gain or a loss.  PT also finds that individuals generally frame a loss as being more 439 
painful than an equally sized gain, a condition known as loss aversion.  The findings of this 440 
theory lead to a different utility function defined separately under gains and losses as 441 
 U(d) = dα  if d≥0,  442 
 and  443 
 U(d) = - λ(-d)β  if d<0  [10] 444 
where α and β are parameters for the level of risk aversion and λ is the coefficient of loss 445 
aversion.  Prospect theory also states that individuals attach much greater weight to low 446 
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probabilities than the measures found in expected utility theory.  This difference can be 447 
accounted for by a weighing function of the probabilities, which can be modeled by 448 
 W(p) = pγ / [pγ+(1-p)γ]1/γ      [11] 449 
where W(p) is the weight attached to the probabilities, p is the actual probability, and γ is a 450 
parameter defining how the probabilities are weighed.  After the weighted probabilities are 451 
accounted for, the expected utility is found in a similar way to expected utility theory with the 452 
summation 453 
             [12] 454 
 455 
 456 
where n is the number of possible outcomes, w(p)k is the weighted probability of outcome k, and 457 
Uk is the utility of outcome k (Harrison and Rutström, 2008).  This model indicates that when 458 
people are making risky choices, they do not have a consistent preference for risk, but make 459 
choices according to how they weigh probabilities and frame the decision as a potential loss or 460 
gain.   461 
 The Black Sea area has been subject to  political turmoil,  invasions of hostile species 462 
and  long term trends of pollution and  overexploitation.  Given the  many problems  faced by 463 
fishers with the dwindling catch and landed fish in the Black Sea, the differences between EUT 464 
and PT  have important implications on how fishers will react to risk.  Studies find that 465 
individuals will be either risk-seeking for losses of moderate or high probability, risk-averse for 466 
losses of low probability, risk-seeking for gains of low probability, and risk-averse for gains of a 467 
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moderate to high probability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).  This structure, known as the 468 
fourfold pattern, indicates that the fishers will make decisions based on whether they anticipate a 469 
low or high probability of the other fisher defecting, and whether they frame receiving the lower 470 
value as a higher loss or a lower gain.  Given that the fishers obtain some value out of the fish 471 
that they catch, it is reasonable to expect that they will view each outcome as either a lower or 472 
higher gain, and not as a loss.  Considering the evidence that players eventually tend toward the 473 
risk dominant strategy, and the appeal of the risk dominant strategy to the other player, it would 474 
also be reasonable to assume that the fisher would expect the probability that the other fisher 475 
would defect to be at least moderate or higher.  This indicates that in this situation both players 476 
frame their payoffs as gains and expect there to be a moderate chance that the other player will 477 
defect and substantially lower their payoff.  According to the fourfold pattern, in this situation 478 
we would expect the fishers to be more risk-averse, and thus less likely to cooperate.   479 
 Another important factor affecting  player cooperation  is whether players can 480 
communicate with one another during the game.  In the study of games with both risk and payoff 481 
equilibria by Clark et al., (2001),  players who were not allowed to communicate did not tend to 482 
move toward a payoff dominant equilibrium but did tend to do so  when communication was 483 
allowed.   These findings are very  similar to the  arguments in the previous section, which found 484 
that social norms and communication can support cooperation between players.  This may 485 
indicate that with communication, trust and collective rationality may be able to develop, so that 486 
players can make decisions in the best interest of the group, and not just for themselves as 487 
individuals.  If social norms and communication between multi-national Black Sea fishermen 488 
can develop, fishers may be more likely to cooperate to keep the harvesting of fish at a moderate 489 
level.  While the continuing fall in the fish population indicates that fishermen have not yet 490 
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developed these norms, supporting cooperation and communication among the fishermen can 491 
encourage them to fish at a more sustainable level.   492 
 Overall, we generally find that fishers’ risk aversion would negatively affect their 493 
ability to cooperate with one another to harvest fish at a sustainable rate.  This is based on 494 
observation of their lifetime experiences with economic depression, and the short time horizon 495 
and a large discount rate for the future  in which they frame the gains or losses that they 496 
experience while fishing.  Lack of trust and lack of strong social norms regarding fishing also 497 
seems to weaken their ability to choose the risky strategy, even though it may be better for the 498 
environment overall.  499 
 500 
3.2 Conclusions 501 
  Both the empirical evidence and our theoretical model indicate that fisheries in 502 
the Black Sea are strongly at risk of facing further decline.  Many fish species have disappeared 503 
over the past few decades, as pollution, invasion of hostile species  and overexploitation 504 
contributed to sharply declining fish catch.  This phenomenon has many implications for the 505 
household income and  protein intake of households around the Black Sea. 506 
 Our theoretical model indicates that, although there is some possibility of 507 
cooperation, the common property of the sea will tend to encourage risk-averse fishers to 508 
overfish at unsustainable levels.  Social norms may be one way of encouraging cooperation and 509 
trust among fishers, but they have only developed in a limited way.  These findings indicate that 510 
government policy should focus on encouraging fishers to have individual incentives to restrict 511 
how much they fish.  The most effective policy for this would be for governments surrounding 512 
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the Black Sea to provide a network of information for fishers that choose to restrict their fishing 513 
to a more sustainable level.  The riparian countries have already been cooperating on limiting 514 
pollution since the Bucharest Convention of 1992.  However, there is little cooperation on 515 
sustainable levels needed for  maintaining future harvests, except  randomly enforced local limits  516 
on the size and type of catch.    An information and education network could alter the payoffs to 517 
fishers and also change their risk attitudes so that it will be in each of their interests to fish at a 518 
level that the environment can support.   519 
 An area of research that should be addressed in future is a more detailed multi-520 
national study of the social norms and attitudes of individual fishermen in the Black Sea.    By 521 
gaining further understanding of these informal rules, governments in the region will be able to 522 
work with fishers more effectively and successfully encourage them to fish at a supportable 523 
level. From an empirical standpoint, spreading knowledge and awareness about the MSY of total 524 
fish catch as well as potential biomass loss from pollution and species invasion could lead to a 525 
greater sense of collective rationality. In a large basin region such as the Black Sea’s,  local 526 
communities practicing sustainable harvests are not able to see the larger picture of runoff 527 
pollution, overexploitation by other country fishers, or changing biodiversity. Reducing 528 
aggregate fish catch to a sustainable level in such a large body of water will require both 529 
education and coordinated policy action by individual countries and regional economic 530 
coalitions.   531 
 532 
 533 
 534 
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i
 Note that  all riparian countries except Turkey  had political  regime changes  in 1990 s which 
may have affected the catch but we  do not have any studies  on the impact of political changes 
in the fisheries sector.   
 
ii
 For more information on the pollution control aspects and three protocols, see 
http://www.blacksea-commission.org/. 
  
iii
 We are not suggesting perpetual subsidies on fishing which are subject to potential abuse and 
asymmetric corruption.  This is a one-time subsidy for this particular example. Past observations  
show  that successful subsidies which achieve real outcomes are  set for a short and  limited time 
period and are not extended regardless of pressure and of bargaining. 
 
iv
 Calculations are not reported here for parsimony and are available on request. 
v
 The players’ choice between choosing either a payoff or risk dominant strategy reflects a choice 
between two different methods with which each player can maximize their payoffs.  By choosing 
a payoff dominant strategy, the player chooses  a maximax strategy, in which he seeks to gain the 
maximum possible outcome.    By choosing a risk dominant strategy, the player chooses a 
maximin strategy, in which he seeks  to maximize the smallest possible gain he  can receive with 
certainty (Pearman, 1977).  The choice between either a maximin or a maximax strategy 
indicates two different ways players may choose to make decisions, depending on how much 
they prefer certainty over risk. 
 
 
vi
 An experimental study conducted by Schmidt, et al.  (2003) tested players to find that players 
generally responded to changes in the risk dominant strategy, and did not respond to changes in 
the payoff dominant strategy.  The authors argue that this study indicates that risk dominant 
strategies are important in determining whether players will be able to cooperate, and, while 
payoff dominant strategies are also important, they seem to have less of an effect (Schmidt et al., 
2003).  A study by Straub found that when players play repeated games, they tended to converge 
away from the payoff dominant strategy and toward the risk dominant strategy (Straub, 1996).  
Together, these studies indicate that players tend to be risk-averse and thus are less likely to 
cooperate to gain a higher payoff. 
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Table 1. Black Sea Landing Composition by Country and Species in 2008 (in tons) 
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Species Bulgaria Georgia Romania 
Russian  
Fed. Turkey Ukraine Total % 
Anchovy 28.0 25938.0 15.0 9070.0 225344.0 4298.2 264693.2 71.74 
Sprat 4310.0 0.3 234.0 7814.0 38999.0 21110.8 72468.1 19.64 
Horse mackerel 180.0 8.0 11.0  14741.0 365.6 15305.6 4.15 
Whiting  15.0 55.0 96.0 10986.0 8.6 11160.6 3.02 
Bluefish 25.0    1787.0  1812.0 0.49 
Mullets nei 0.0 1.0 8.0 81.0 1518.0 91.5 1699.5 0.46 
Turbot 55.0  47.0  458.0 251.4 811.4 0.22 
Red mullet 17.0    706.0 45.2 768.2 0.21 
Picked dogfish 23.0  10.0   79.2 112.2 0.03 
Pontic shad 29.0  47.0 2.0  16.6 94.6 0.03 
Raja nei      54.2 54.2 0.01 
 
Source: Background Documents on the Black Sea Fisheries, GFCM, Jan 2012, p. 14,  
http://151.1.154.86/GfcmWebSite/SAC/WGBS/2012/GFCM-Background-Doc-BlackSea-
Fisheries.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Drainage in the Black Sea Area 
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          Source: With permission from UNEP/GRID-Arendal, 2006,    
http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/drainage-in-the-black-sea-area_f058 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Plot of  Total and Anchovy Fish Catch in the Black Sea, 1970-2010 (thousands of 
tons) 
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Source:   Data plotted from 
http://www.fao.org/figis/servlet/SQServlet?file=/work/FIGIS/prod/webapps/figis/temp/hqp_90882
85911198033225.xml&outtype=html 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Movement Toward Pure Nash ESS and Proportion of Cooperating/Non-
cooperating Fishermen 
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